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Neoplatonism in the Liber Naturalis 
and Shifā: De anima or Metaphysica 




Avicenna or Ibn Sīnā was born circa 980 in Afshna, near Bukhara, in Persia. 
He worked briefly for the Samanid administration, but left Bukhara, and 
lived in the area of Tehran and Isfahan, where he completed the Shifā (Heal-
ing [from error]) under the patronage of the Daylamite ruler, ‘Ala’-al Dawla, 
and wrote his most important Persian work, the Dānish-nāma, which con-
tains works on logic, metaphysics, physics, and mathematics.  
      In the Liber Naturalis (al-Tabi’iyyat) of Avicenna, sensory thought, vir-
tus cogitativa, is illuminated by the active intellect, intelligentia agens. Avi-
cenna followed Alexander of Aphrodisias in defining the potential intellect, 
the nous pathetikos or nous dynamei, as the material intellect, intellectus ma-
terialis, in contrast to the intelligentia or nous poietikos. The material intel-
lect is seen as a passive substratum of ideas and as a capacity for thought, as 
a pure potency in relation to act, by which intelligibles can be apprehended. 
Avicenna defines the capacity to apprehend intelligibles in the anima ration-
alis as incorporeal, though it is a capacity of material intellect. In the Liber 
Naturalis, “in man there is some substance that apprehends the intelligible 
by receiving it.” Thus “the substance that is the subject of the intelligibles is 
not body nor does it in any way have being because of body, it being the 
power [virtus] in the body, or its form” (6.5.2).1 That substance or virtus of 
the anima rationalis is eternal, to the extent that the active intellect is able to 
participate in it. 
      For Avicenna, the potential knowing of the material intellect is actual-
ized when intelligibles are projected onto it from the purely intellectual and 
incorporeal, which is the active intellect, which is capable of abstracting in-
telligible forms. In the Liber Naturalis, “the cause for giving intelligible 
form is nothing but the active intellect, in whose power are the principles of 
abstract intelligible forms” (6.5.5). Avicenna calls the active intellect the 
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giver of forms. Forms emanate from active intellect constantly and eternally, 
but not as the result of any will on the part of active intellect. Forms in active 
intellect are indivisible and perfect in their incorporeality, but matter is not 
capable of receiving them as such, because it is not properly prepared for 
them in its particularities and differentiation. Forms thus emanate as differ-
entiated, in sequential arrangements of terms which are particular to human 
discourse in discursive or cogitative knowledge.  
      Cogitative knowledge, connected to corporeals in sense perception, is 
different from knowledge of principles or intelligibles, which requires the 
participation of active intellect in actual intellect, as in the Intellectual Prin-
ciple of Plotinus, in contrast to Reason Principle. Plotinus was not known to 
Arab scholars by name, but parts of the Enneads were paraphrased in the 
Theology of Aristotle. For Avicenna, cogitative reason is necessary to ascend 
from material intellect to actual intellect, as dialectic is necessary to ascend 
to intellection for Plotinus. In Avicenna this involves the stage which is 
called intellectus in habitu, habitual intellect. Intellectus in habitu is de-
scribed as an intellect as a state, nous kath hexin, a state of preparedness for 
intellection, as in the thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
      Intellectus in habitu is an intellect in act, intellectus in effectu, though not 
in constant act, only when turned towards active intellect. Intellectus in 
habitu operates according to principles or first intelligibles, in the participa-
tion of active intellect, when the intelligible is present in it, as reflected, il-
luminated or emanated by active intellect, in an acquired intellect, an 
intellectus accommodatus, or an intellect acquired from outside human intel-
lect, accommodatus ab extrinsecus. The intellectus in habitu leads to an ac-
tualized intellect, which is able to separate itself from the corporeals of sense 
perception and the mechanisms of material intellect. In the Liber Naturalis, 
“Thus the rational soul, being in a certain kind of union with the forms, is 
capable of having present in it free from all admixture the forms that come 
from the light of the active intellect itself” (6.5.5). 
      First intelligibles lead to second intelligibles as the illumination of active 
intellect is more clearly received. In this process, intellectus in habitu leads 
to acquired intellect, intellect which operates according to the reflected 
forms or intelligibles of active intellect into the corporeal world and material 
intellect. Cogitative reason prepares the material intellect to receive the ema-
nation of the active intellect, by allowing the intelligentia agens to corre-
spond the sensible form with the intelligible form in perception. The sensible 
form is presented by the cogitative faculty, in the retention and assimilation 
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of the phantasm in the sensus communis, and this provides the substrate for 
the participation of active intellect in the anima rationalis. The phantasm or 
sensible form retained in memoria provides a source to which the anima ra-
tionalis can return continually for sustenance in its cogitative activities, as in 
Enneads IV.3.29 of Plotinus.  
      The anima rationalis does not need to return to the form image, though, 
and the more it develops in intellectus in habitu, the less dependent it be-
comes on corporeal sense perception, the less it needs to return to the image. 
Once the anima rationalis has achieved actual intellect, the sensible forms 
retained in the memoria are only distractions, and they should thus be ig-
nored and excluded from the intellective process, as Avicenna describes in 
the Shifā: De anima (223) or Metaphysica, because by then the actual intel-
lect is able to understand the a priori intelligible form as the basis for the 
sensible form, and its operation can become solely dependent on that which 
comes from outside it, in the emanation of active intellect. For Plotinus, the 
sensible forms fade away. 
      In the Liber Naturalis (6.5.6), knowledge of intelligible objects necessi-
tates the ability of intellect to recall to mind the forms in phantasia, sensible 
and intelligible forms, and thoughts or intentions in memoria, the two reten-
tive functions of sense perception. Knowledge of intelligibles also necessi-
tates the ability of intellectus in habitu to be joined with active intellect, 
through emanation or illumination, in order for the intelligible thought, ip-
sum intellectum, to be formed, in the conjoining of the sensible and intelligi-
ble form. The intelligible thought though is not always present to intellect or 
formed in intellect; it is present eternally in active intellect, but its presence 
in actual intellect requires the development of intellect in intellectus in 
habitu. Through development in intellectus in habitu, the anima rationalis is 
able to conjoin with active intellect when it chooses to do so. When the ani-
ma rationalis is willing, the intelligible form flows into it from active intel-
lect, in the capacity of actual or actualized intellect, made possible through 
acquired intellect, intellectus adeptus or intellectus accommodatus. 
      Avicenna compares the relation between active intellect and material in-
tellect to the relation between the sun and the sense of sight. In the Liber 
Naturalis, “for just as the sun is actually seen through itself, and what before 
was not actually visible through its light, so also the disposition of the [ac-
tive] intellect is in relation to our souls” (6.5.5). Active intellect makes intel-
ligibles visible to the anima rationalis, if the anima rationalis is turned 
toward active intellect in actual intellect or acquired intellect, intellectus ac-
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commodatus. The sun is seen by its own light, while objects perceived in vi-
sion are seen by the light of the sun. For Avicenna, the material intellect is 
able to see the form of the thing in the oculus mentis, by the light of the ac-
tive intellect, which proceeds or emanates from a first cause and illuminates 
the form of the thing as the intelligible form, in the irradiatio spiritualis, the 
illumination or reflection in the anima rationalis. 
      In the Shifā: De anima of Avicenna, intelligibles are differentiated in the 
compositive imaginative faculty, as in Enneads IV.3.29. According to Ploti-
nus, the object of sense perception, the sensible form, is preserved in 
memory as a representation, an intelligible form; the impression of the object 
passes away while the representation remains present to the imagination, the 
image-making faculty. For Avicenna, active intellect transforms sense per-
ceptions into principles, which are the first intelligible thoughts. In Enneads 
I.3.5, the principles are provided by the Intellectual Principle, through which 
dialectic reaches intellection. In the De anima (3.7.431b2) of Aristotle, the 
human intellect thinks the forms in the images, and the sensible form is given 
by the intelligible form, which is formed in the imagination or phantasia and 
is presented to discursive reason in the process of perception. According to 
Avicenna, in the Shifā: De anima (235), the image or species is formed in the 
sensus communis, and is then received by the imaginative faculty, the phan-
tasia, which combines the images in different configurations, according to 
the spatial and temporal sequencing of discursive reason in material intellect. 
Discursive reason then receives an abstraction of the species from the phan-
tasia, a representation of the intelligible form which corresponds to the sen-
sible form.  
      In the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna, “The rational faculty, illuminated in 
us by the light of the active intellect, considers the particulars that are in the 
imagination,” and “in this way they are rendered free from matter and its ap-
pendages and are imprinted in the rational soul” (6.5.6). The active intellect 
is that which illuminates, the ellampôn, while potential intellect contains 
what is illuminated, the ellampomenoi, and the multiple particulars which 
illuminate, the ellampontes. The illumination of the particulars frees the par-
ticulars from their corporeal dependence, in that the incorporeality of light 
can participate in them, and the illumination allows the particulars to be 
transposed into universals or intelligibles, as they “do not move by them-
selves from imagination toward our intellect.” The intelligible is not possible 
without the particular, but it is not the particular which causes the intelligi-
ble, nor is it the faculty of human intelligence, which alone cannot exceed its 
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corporeal mechanisms. 
      Because for Avicenna intelligibles cannot actually exist in the human in-
tellect, because they are incorporeal and properties of active intellect, as Pla-
tonic archetypes, only knowledge of intelligibles can exist in human 
intellect, so the illumination of active intellect is not of the intelligibles 
themselves, differing from Aristotle, but of the faculty in the anima rational-
is to know the intelligibles. The illumination is of the phantasia, the mecha-
nism of the anima rationalis, and not of the potential intelligibles in 
phantasia. The illumination is not of the intelligible form in the oculus men-
tis, but of the perception of the intelligible form in the oculus mentis, in ac-
tual or acquired intellect as active intellect participates in it through 
emanation or illumination. The species does not become an intelligible in its 
being transported from the compositive imagination, but rather in its being 
perceived by acquired intellect, which is so disposed because it is in con-
junction with active intellect through illumination, as described in the Shifā: 
De anima (235–236). It is the oculus mentis rather than the species itself 
which is illuminated, the flashlight rather than the object which the flashlight 
makes visible. 
      In the Shifā: De anima (247), Avicenna compares the ability of intellect 
to achieve acquired intellection through the illumination of active intellect 
with the eye which has been made healthy in its vision through treatment, so 
it is able to see clearly. In the Liber Naturalis, “learning for the first time is 
like the healing of an eye, which, having been made healthy, can, when it 
wants to, apprehend a form by looking upon some individual” (6.5.6). The 
healthy eye, like the healthy anima rationalis, is able to perceive the intelli-
gible form in the sensible form. 
      Avicenna also compared the ability of intellect to achieve acquired intel-
lection to a mirror. Intellect can only achieve acquired intellection if it is 
turned towards active intellect and is able to perceive reflections of intelligi-
bles, as in a mirror. The intelligibles are not actually in intellect in the same 
way that corporeal forms, or sensible bodies, are not actually in a mirror. In 
Enneads IV.3.30, “the verbal expression” in discursive reason, “unfolds its 
content and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making pow-
er,” in the formation of the intelligible form in acquired intellect, “and so 
shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehen-
sion and persistence and memory of it” (IV.3.30).2 Discursive reason in ma-
terial intellect mirrors the intelligible in acquired intellect, the Intellectual 
Principle of Plotinus, which for Avicenna is already a mirror reflection of the 
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intelligible in active intellect. Thus in Enneads I.4.10, discursive reason “be-
comes like the reflection resting on the smooth and shining surface of a mir-
ror.” The phantasm or sensible form exists in sense perception as a reflection 
of the principia conoscendi, the intelligible form in intellection, from ac-
quired intellect.  
      For Plotinus there can be no immediate sense perception of an object, 
without the mediation of the mirror reflection of the intelligible form of the 
object in intellect; the same can be said for Avicenna. In Enneads I.1.8, the 
intelligible form in intellect becomes the sensible form in sense perception, 
“not by merging into body but by giving forth, without any change in itself, 
images or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors,” in the 
same way that active intellect presents the intelligible to acquired intellect. 
Acquired intellect is only capable of receiving the intelligible to the extent of 
its limitations, as differentiated or sequentially arranged, in the same way 
that the mirror is only capable of receiving an image according to its corpo-
real state, adjusted in size and position. 
      In the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna, the anima rationalis consists of five 
internal senses. The sensus communis is sensory representation in the com-
mon sense, which coordinates the five external senses. The retentive imagi-
nation or phantasia preserves the sensations processed by the sensus 
communis. The sensations preserved in phantasia are then processed in a 
compositive imagination. Memory or memoria preserves the perceptions of 
the vis aestimativa as traces or mnemic residues. The vis aestimativa or vis 
existimationis is the intuitive faculty which performs sensual judgment.3 The 
internal senses are also explained in the Shifā: De anima (44–45). Both the 
phantasia and memoria are seen as a kind of “storehouse” for what is appre-
hended; phantasia stores the forms apprehended by sense perception, the 
sensible form, while memoria stores the intentiones connected with the spe-
cies, the capacity for discernment of intellect, apprehended by the vis aesti-
mativa, as what might be the verbal expression of discursive reason for 
Plotinus, in the formation of language.  
      The intentiones would correspond to the signified in language, as the 
phonetic form of the word as signifier is received in sense perception as the 
sensible form, and is then retained as a mnemic residue in phantasia as the 
intentio, into which it has been transformed by the vis aestimativa of the ac-
tual intellect or intelligentia agens. Once the word in language has become 
the intelligible form in the memoria as the intentio, once the signifier has 
been connected to the signified, then intellect is able to reinsert it into the 
John Hendrix 7 
corporeal particulars of language in the mechanics of discursive reason, as it 
is able to see it as illuminated by active intellect as signified, separated from 
the corporeal. In the Liber Naturalis, “learning is nothing but the attainment 
of a perfect disposition for uniting oneself with the active intellect until this 
becomes a cognition that is simple,” in the unification of the signifier and 
signified, sensible and intelligible form, “and from which emanate ordered 
forms by virtue of the thought activity of the soul” (6.5.6). As the unified 
cognitions are stored in memoria as intentiones, they will pass as a sensible 
form in phantasia unless the illumination of active intellect is turned toward 
them through the mechanisms of actualized intellect, through intellectus in 
habitu. 
      In the Liber Naturalis, “That which receives is not the same as that 
which preserves. The storehouse of that which is apprehended by sense is the 
faculty of imagination,” phantasia, “while the storehouse for that which ap-
prehends intentions,” thesaurus apprehendentis intentionem, “is memory” 
(6.4.1). Phantasia and memoria are not active participants in intellection; the 
memory traces are present in them only when they are not participating in 
intellection, when the anima rationalis is not aware of them. Thus the image 
“is preserved in its preserving faculty whenever the soul averts its attention 
from it,” and “these preserving faculties do not apprehend,” rather, “they are 
a storehouse,” and “if the apprehending or judging faculty (vis aestimativa) 
of either the intellect or the soul turns towards it, then they encounter that 
which is already in possession…” When the species or intentio is not playing 
a role in the processes of actual intellect, it can be found in the phantasia or 
memoria, in the inert substratum of potential intellect. “A storehouse is as-
signed to those forms that at certain times are not contemplated by the esti-
mative faculty,” the species in phantasia, and “a storehouse is also assigned 
to those intentions that, at certain times, are not considered by the estimative 
faculty,” the intentiones in memoria. 
      When a perception is forgotten it is preserved in the phantasia or memo-
ria, but is inaccessible to conscious thought. The forgetting of a perception is 
a result of the inability of the anima rationalis to be able to receive the illu-
mination of the active intellect, to be able to function according to higher in-
tellectual faculties. The memory of a sensory perception is different from the 
memory of an intelligible. The intelligible, in that it is indivisible, cannot be 
present in a corporeal organ, or known through a physical faculty, as it can-
not subsist in a divisible substratum, as explained in the Shifā: De anima 
(209). Intelligibles can thus not be retained by an internal sense such as the 
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phantasia or memoria, and not be present in material intellect. The intelligi-
ble is only present in active intellect, as an incorporeal; it is accessible to ma-
terial intellect, and it can participate in material intellect, but material 
intellect cannot participate in it. Thus for Avicenna the intelligible is more of 
a Platonic archetype, existing separately from human intellect, than the Aris-
totelian intelligible which subsists in human intellect, to be illuminated by 
active intellect. The intelligible emanates to the anima rationalis and partici-
pates in it according to the Plotinian model. The intelligible is able to partic-
ipate in material intellect by acquired intellect, which allows the anima 
rationalis to overcome the defects and limitations to which it is subject in its 
connection to corporeality. The intelligible is eternally and consistently ac-
cessible to material intellect, but material intellect is not always capable of 
receiving it, as it is subject to temporal and spatial limitations. 
      In the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna, active intellect and material intellect 
are mediated by an intellect which is both active and potential, intellectus in 
habitu, which is a state of preparedness for intellection in the participation of 
active intellect. It is a precondition for knowledge of both sensibles and intel-
ligibles in material intellect, in the connection between the anima rationalis 
and the corporeal. Once the anima rationalis is separated from the corporeal, 
it no longer requires the preparatory sensory potencies assimilated in the sen-
sus communis, and is capable of union with the active intellect, insofar as it 
can receive the participation of active intellect. “But when the soul is once 
freed from body and from the accidents of body, it will be capable of union 
with the active intellect, and in this intellect it shall find intelligible beauty 
and eternal delight” (6.5.6).  
      In Enneads II.9.16, if the actual intellect in the anima rationalis is able to 
perceive intelligible beauty in active intellect, then the anima rationalis is 
able to perceive manifestations of that beauty in the sensible realm, in sense 
perception, in the reflection of intelligibles. Intelligible beauty is perceived 
in sensible objects “by recognizing in the objects depicted to the eyes the 
presentation of what lies in the idea.” In seeing intelligible beauty in the 
beauty of a body, for example, “the sight of Beauty excellently reproduced 
upon a face hurries the mind to that other Sphere,” of the archetypal intelli-
gible in active intellect, as described in the Symposium of Plato.  
      It is possible in Plotinus that intelligible beauty, that which is the source 
of corporeal beauty, can be represented in the sensible world, or, at least, that 
forms in the sensible world can suggest intelligible beauty, or the possibility 
of such beauty. For Plotinus it is the contemplation of sensible forms in per-
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ception, and the consciousness of perception as distinct from the sensible 
forms, and the distinction between the sensible form and the intelligible 
form, as in actual intellect, which leads to the contemplation of the intelligi-
ble in sense perception. While the perception of intelligible beauty is only 
possible for the anima rationalis which has been disciplined for it in intellec-
tus in habitu, intelligible beauty is present always in every intellect as a po-
tentiality. Intelligible beauty may be perceived in a sensible object in the 
understanding in actual intellect that the beauty of a form has nothing to do 
with the form itself, but with how the form corresponds to the idea of beauty, 
the intelligible beauty, in the intellect.  
      This is illustrated by Plotinus in Enneads V.8.1 by comparing two blocks 
of stone, one of which is carved into a statue by a craftsman, so that in which 
“the form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters into 
the stone…” The beauty of the stone preexists the stone as intelligible beau-
ty, as the intelligible form preexists the sensible form, and the sensible beau-
ty in the stone is just a “derivative and a minor” of that prior beauty, the 
intelligible beauty, as material forms are shadows and reflections of intelli-
gible forms. The material form of the stone, because it is tied to the corpore-
al, is limited as to how much it can participate in the intelligible beauty. 
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